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Introduction
During 1980, Salvadoran citizens endured increased violence, torture, and overall
suppression of their basic human rights. Many prominent figures were assassinated by either
right-wing death squads or leftist insurgents. Then on December 2, 1980 came the murder of four
American churchwomen from the Maryknoll Order. Their purpose was to aid the poor within
Latin America; El Salvador gave them the opportunity to help the Salvadoran poor in the midst
of this violence. However, they were met with suspicion by security forces and, as a result were
raped and killed on a dirt road. Within a week, President Jimmy Carter cut economic and
military aid as well as launched an investigation in El Salvador to find and hold the perpetrators
accountable for the four murders and further, investigate the Salvadoran government’s
involvement in the ongoing murders of 1980.
In Washington, D.C., these December events served as a tipping point for Carter and
provide a window into understanding how Carter balanced his desire to support human rights
against more traditional American Cold War fears about national security and the expansion of
Communist power in Latin America. While many previous scholars analyze the success of
Carter’s foreign policy through a political and economic lens, with the intention of seeing U.S.
national interest as the key to a successful presidency1, many neglect to see President Carter
through a lens that accentuates who he was: an activist.2 While many saw his reaction to the
murder of the churchwomen as an impulsive and irrational presidential decision, his actions can
1
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Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 54 no. 4 (U1978); Linda B. Miller, “Morality in Foreign
Policy: A Failed Consensus?” Daedalus 109 no. 3 (1980).
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An activist is defined as a person who is fighting for social, political, or economic justice to
improve current conditions within society.
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also portray Carter as a strategic and resilient activist.3 Moreover, the divided junta in El
Salvador, the buildup of internal disputes within Carter’s administration, the continuous neglect
of human rights as American policy in El Salvador from January to December 1980, the
overarching issue of the Cold War, and the timing of this event allowed Carter to step into the
role of an activist to put emphasis on the human rights policy he had initially proposed when
coming into office in 1977. To understand how Carter got to this tipping point, this article will
delve into the factors mentioned above to understand, in detail, how Carter and his
administration increasingly felt frustrated with balancing Carter’s human rights agenda and the
importance of winning the Cold War. By simultaneously looking at different perspectives of the
events that occurred that year, the view that Carter had a naive approach to U.S. Foreign Policy
transitions into seeing Carter’s radical hope of changing the overall structure of U.S. Foreign
Policy, which puts Carter’s human rights approach wiser beyond its years.
Jimmy Carter’s victory in the presidential election of 1976 marked a significant shift in
the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy, which reflected the morals and values Carter
held as President and as an individual. Carter’s religious upbringing as an evangelical Christian
as well as the influence from his parents shaped his concern and care for human rights globally.
As a native of Georgia, he actively participated in the Southern Baptist Convention where he
learned that all people, as children of God, should be protected and cared for equally. As for his
parents, his mother’s actions of crossing segregated lines to counsel African American women
3
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on healthcare taught him to care for people’s lives other than his own. During the 1950s, he
demonstrated his resistance against social injustice and human rights violations when he was the
only white male to refuse membership of the White Citizens Council, a segregationist
organization. A few years later, Carter slowly became more active in local boards for public
institutions such as hospitals and libraries and sat on the Sumter County Board of Education. He
eventually became Governor of Georgia in 1971. While he minimized appearances toward
African American communities and tried to get endorsed by well-renowned segregationists
during his election campaign to gain votes, his primary agenda when elected governor was to call
for an end to segregation in the South. As governor of Georgia, “he increased the number of
African American staff members in Georgia’s government by 25 percent” and addressed the
need for protecting the environment and providing greater funding in public education.4
Carter’s support for human rights was reflected well in the positions he held and the
actions he took before his presidency. His desire for the U.S. to give equal opportunity to all
citizens, regardless of race during a time of racial and political turbulence, was not only
addressed, but executed by him. Furthermore, his care for the environment and the funding of
civic entities aided in creating a community that was well-resourced for all U.S. citizens. When
he became the 39th President of the United States, his foreign policy agenda echoed the actions
and policies of his past.
His human rights agenda encompassed the importance of transparency, true democracy,
and world peace. After Nixon’s Watergate Scandal, the secretive foreign policy practices of the
government, and the continuous human right violations in developing nations, the U.S.
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population wanted a president who could reintroduce the American values of justice, democracy,
and liberty. In an address iterated during his presidential campaign in 1975, Carter spoke of what
his human rights agenda meant for the future of America’s foreign relations. He condemned past
tactics U.S. government officials used during the Cold War: the vicious cycle of installing
democracy and/or suppressing communism within other developing nations, resulting in
repressive methods of torture, assassinations, and disappearances of civilians by governments the
U.S. had established or supported to win proxy wars around the globe. As Carter put it himself:
We have learned that never again should our country become militarily involved
in the internal affairs of another nation unless there is a direct and obvious threat
to the security of the United States or its people. We must not use the CIA or
other covert means to effect violent change in any government or government
policy. Such involvements are not in the best interests of world peace, and they
are almost inherently doomed to failure.
When we embrace one of the contending leadership factions in a country, too
often it is the power of the United States, not the support of the people, which
keeps that leader in power. Our chosen leader may then resort to repressive force
against his own people to keep himself in power. 5
In addition, he expressed how the U.S. used undemocratic values of incentive, coercion and
repression to institute U.S. democracy in the first place, and how his human rights agenda would
change that:
[A] lesson to be learned is that we cannot impose democracy on another country
by force. Also, we cannot buy friends; and it is obvious that other nations resent it
if we try. Our interests lie in protecting our national security, in preventing war, in
peacefully promoting the principles of human freedom and democracy, and in
exemplifying in our foreign policy the true character and attitudes of the
American people. 6
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With this in mind, he communicated his future aspirations of changing previous objectives of
U.S. foreign policy to fit his values and morals regarding human rights:
[It] must be the responsibility of the President to restore the moral authority of
this country in its conduct of foreign policy. We should work for peace and the
control of arms in everything we do. We should support the humanitarian
aspirations of the world’s people. Policies that strengthen dictators or create
refugees, policies that prolong suffering or postpone racial justice, weaken that
authority. Policies that encourage economic progress and social justice promote it.
In an age when almost all of the world’s people are tied together by instant
communication, the image of a country, as seen through its policies, has a great
deal to do with what it can accomplish through the traditional channels of
diplomacy.7

While Carter’s genuine intentions for putting human rights at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy
shifted towards a more socially just world, his key policies contradicted the tactics and objectives
that reflected the Cold War mentality.
The end of World War II marked the United States and the Soviet Union as the two
superpowers of the world, and consequently their contradictory ideologies created tensions that
would involve developing nations around the globe to fight the Soviet-American war on
ideology. Communism threatened the capitalist nature of U.S. democracy due to their collectivist
nature and steps to abolish private property. If communism thrived around the globe, U.S.
corporations located in developing countries would have to give back their property to the local
government, and in turn U.S. foreign capital would decrease, which would immediately affect
U.S. economic success. In addition, the United States wanted to be the only superpower.
In order to defend democracy, and halt the spread of communism, the United States used
the tactics of “containment,” a conceptual framework theorized by George F. Kennan, a foreign
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service officer, in 1947 to literally contain or enclose the spread of communism.8 Containment
was used in developing countries that had uprisings and bursts of communist ideologies,
especially in Latin America, which the U.S. saw as their own backyard. Western containment
policy within Latin American began in 1947 and the techniques used included the use of
economic assistance and collective defense agreements. 9 Containment policy echoed in policies
made by numerous presidents during the Cold War. President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for
Progress promised $20 billion in assistance via loans and provided $80 billion to Latin American
governments to decrease Soviet and Cuban influence and ensure democracy was the only
ideology in place.10 Furthermore, Kennedy’s inaugural speech amplified the lengths the U.S.
would go to contain communism and spread democracy: “Let every nation know, whether it
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support
any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” 11 Lyndon
B. Johnson continued this legacy by choosing Thomas C. Mann to become the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mann was known to assess governments’
commitment to U.S. values through their commitment to anti-communism, not their commitment
to democracy. 12
President Richard Nixon took it one step further with his National Security Advisor,
Henry Kissinger where they implemented the political philosophy of realpolitik, which uses
8
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pragmatic, and “no-nonsense” objectives when forming policies that explicitly disregard ethical
considerations.13 Nixon and Kissinger applied realpolitik when they secretly funded independent
organizations in Chile to prevent Salvador Allende, a member of the Popular Unity Party
(Socialist Party) to win the presidential election to first, prevent the nationalization of two major
Chilean copper companies, Anaconda and Kennicott, which were owned by corporations in the
United States and second, prevent the spread of socialist reform and thought.14 However, their
strategy did not work and Allende became President in 1970; his presidential agenda included
reforming healthcare, agriculture, and education as well as nationalizing more businesses and
farms in Chile.15 Three years later, Nixon and the CIA idly sat by when the coup that ended
Allende’s reign and began Augusto Pinochet’s, a Chilean general and dictator, dictatorship
ensued. They may have not instigated the coup yet, they were “aware of the coup-plotting, had
ongoing intelligence collection relationships with some plotters, and —because CIA did not
discourage the takeover and had sought to instigate a coup in 1970—probably appeared to
condone it.”16 It did not matter if Allende’s reforms would benefit the Chilean people, U.S.
interest came first even at the hands of a brutal dictator. The U.S. had a job to contain
communism at whatever cost, even at the expense of human rights. As long as communism was
contained and furthermore eradicated from a specific area, the U.S. had reached its foreign
policy goals. Jimmy Carter wanted to change that. However his policies, contradictory to
previous foreign policy, proved unsuccessful due to the omnipresence of the Cold War.

13

“Realpolitik,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed May 30, 2018,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/realpolitik.
14
“The Allende Years and the Pinochet Coup, 1969-1973,” Office of the Historian, accessed
June 7, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/allende.
15
Ibid.
16
“CIA Activities in Chile: Awareness of Coup Plotting in 1973,” Central Intelligence Agency,
last modified September 18, 2000, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/.
9

Carter’s policies are still disputed among historians and political scientists on their
effectiveness and necessity during his time in office. Political scientists Alexander Moens and
Erwin C. Hardgrove provide arguments that Carter’s policies were not efficient nor successful.
In Foreign Policy under Carter, Moen delves into defining and applying the multiple advocacy
model to analyze President Jimmy Carter and his administration’s policy-making process. Moens
argues that it was not Carter’s ideology regarding human rights that contributed to his failings;
rather it was his open, decentralized decision-making process that hindered his ability to create
successful policy outcomes, proving his policies to be ineffective. This process allowed his
cabinet to be of equal status; Carter did not even have a Chief of Staff. Due to this, Carter
personally involved himself in the decision-making process and was able to assess and weight
different options and perspectives from his cabinet on all matters. However, Moen’s argues that
his indecisiveness got in the way of making clear decisions when it was necessary, creating an
inconsistent and incoherent set of policies. Moen uses the examples of China, Iran, Africa, and
the USSR to show this.17 In Jimmy Carter as President, Hardgrove uses evidence of Carter’s
management process and style to explain the reasons behind its failure in U.S. foreign policy.
Hardgrove goes as far to question if Carter’s foreign policy goals were pertinent during the Cold
War in the late 70s. He argues that his management of policy within his administration and
abroad were unsuccessful due to his style of wanting a cooperative atmosphere and a sense of
collegiality within his administration. This type of atmosphere failed internally and Hardgrove
states that this is the reason of Carter’s failure in foreign policy. Furthermore, he concludes his
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work by stating that Carter’s heart may have been in the right place yet for the situations at hand,
combating communism in developing nations outweighed the demand for human rights.18
While both of these historians focus on the ineffectiveness and unsuccessful timing of
Carter’s foreign policy agenda, other historians found his policy necessary and inspiring even
with its failed outcomes. Historians David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker as well as specialist in
U.S. foreign policy, William LeoGrande understood that Carter’s policies did not work, and his
reputation of looking “weak” and “incapable” were apparent during his presidency. However
they all acknowledge that Carter’s initiatives were as practical as they could have been given that
the situations in developing countries were complex after years of oppression prior to U.S.
intervention as well as the split narratives that took shape back home. David Schmitz and
Vanessa Walker’s “Jimmy Carter and the foreign policy of Human Rights,” argues against the
common notion that Carter’s policy was “naive” and “simplistic.” On the contrary, they present
information that the Carter Administration was well aware of its contradictions and
inconsistencies, and understood the complex situation of balancing anti-communist tactics and
caring for human rights. Schmitz and Walker praise Carter for sticking to his initial agenda
throughout his whole presidency even though it weakened his reputation as a leader in the Cold
War.19 William LeoGrande analyzes Carter’s policy, specifically in Central America to show
Carter’s practical yet unsuccessful approach in Nicaragua and El Salvador. He criticizes Carter
for his naive approach in El Salvador yet gives credit to his approach in Nicaragua. While
LeoGrande does not outwardly praise Carter for his actions, he argues that the complexity of the
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situation in both Nicaragua and El Salvador meant that these countries’ problems simply could
not be understood from an American perspective.20
While these historians understood the pros and cons of Carter’s policy, other historians
focus on the moral principles Carter espoused and how his drive toward human rights for a more
peaceful world is what the nation needed in a time period where secrecy and deceit had
infiltrated the government. Randall Balmer uses a religious lens to debate this in his work. In
Redeemer, Balmer argues that President Jimmy Carter’s persona and moral principles were
needed during a time where the public could not trust the government, following the Watergate
Scandal. Carter’s religious stance and push for human rights made him a favorable candidate and
helped him win the election. Balmer positively supports Carter’s foreign policy goals, which
replicate religious moral principles. In addition, Balmer states that Carter did the best that he
could to be a successful president even though he lacked support both on the left and right and
was forced to balance U.S. national interest and human rights concerns simultaneously.21
Specifically looking at Carter’s limitations of putting forth human rights policy during the
Cold War, William Michael Schmidli’s The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S.
Cold War Policy Toward Argentina analyzes Carter’s attempt to decrease human rights
violations within Argentina during the midst of the Cold War. Heavily using primary documents
and declassified information, Schmidli illustrates the difficult narrative of pairing Carter’s human
rights with U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, Schmidli looks at the way society kept political
leaders and groups accountable for their actions regarding human rights, thus revealing the
intricacies and complexities of the relationship state policies and political activism share, using
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Argentina as an example. With using a U.S. perspective to understand Carter’s strategy and
execution of human rights within Argentina, Schmidli argues that there are limitations to foreign
policy when it comes to creating change. For Carter, there were limitations to implementing his
human rights agenda in Argentina through the sole use of U.S. Foreign Policy.22
Other scholars have approached analyzing Carter’s foreign policy, particularly toward
Latin America, by studying officials within the Carter administration. While many look to
President Jimmy Carter specifically when trying to investigate his policies, the Carter
administration was filled with strong, contradictory personalities in Carter’s decision-making
apparatus. Two of the key figures for understanding Carter’s policies within El Salvador are
Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor, who had close connections with the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. Another
focal point is Robert White, the Ambassador of El Salvador, who had disparate views that
shaped their ideology of what foreign policy should look like.
In his biography of Brzezinski, Charles Gati describes the national security advisor as
person who made great strides towards putting forth foreign policy that aided U.S. national
interest during the midst of the Cold War. Brzezinski’s tactics regarding anti-communism were
influenced by his upbringing in Poland, his academic career, and persona. Gati attributes his
unique tactics and policies when dealing with communism similar to Henry Kissinger’s actions.
Both Kissinger and Brzezinski grew up with similar backgrounds as well as had almost identical
careers in academia. While both of them were competitive with each other in academic and
career positions, their mutual respect for their work could be seen through personal exchanges as
well as the policies Brzezinski pushed for during Carter’s era. Brzezinski primarily applied
22
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unique ideological tactics to contain communism, as did Kissinger, with the attempt to push
Jimmy Carter’s agenda of human rights by providing nations with military and economic aid if
they followed the human rights agenda Carter put forth. Brzezinski often worked closely and
influenced others within the Cabinet. 23 However, his bitter relationship with the U.S. Secretary
of State, Cyrus Vance was unique in that he was known to steal the spotlight and overstep his
authority on Vance’s decisions and matters, which led to Vance’s resignation.24 Brzezinski’s
strong personality and Cold War strategy, in many cases, set the tone to what foreign policy
looked like around the globe.
Robert White, on the other hand, within vicinity of the atrocities occurring in El
Salvador, put his career and reputation on the line to fight for the rights of Salvadoran citizens
oppressed by the regime funded by the United States government.25 Raymond Bonner’s article, “
The Diplomat who Wouldn’t Lie,” addresses White’s fight to for human rights within El
Salvador, even if American interests were at cost. Bonner argues that while White was an
ambassador, he took an activist role in his position, and this later did cost him his career. While
White understood the dangers of communism within the Western Hemisphere, Bonner highlights
that White was aware that the extreme right were responsible for the murder of innocent
civilians, and on a broader scale, the issue in El Salvador was “a homegrown issue” due to the
decades of oppression from the elites. White did what he could in his power to speak of the
injustice in El Salvador, which later caused his removal. His actions ranged from criticizing
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Latin American dictators to attending Archbishop Romero’s funeral. 26 Pamela Constable also
acknowledges that the ambassador’s principles regarding human rights conflicted with the
United States’ plan to install a moderate government within El Salvador to halt the spread of
communism. Constable argues that while White’s actions wrecked his reputation during the
1980s, retrospectively, his actions should be recognized and applauded. 27 Both of these
contradictory ideologies put Washington at a standstill of what direction their policies should
take, and Salvadoran insurgents and citizens did not receive it well.
Another essential strain within the historiography is the Salvadoran perspective on 1980,
the Civil War, and the Carter administration’s policies vis-á-vis both. Primarily Salvadoran’s
viewed Carter’s foreign policy negatively. Joaquín M. Chávez positively speaks of the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) who spent decades fighting the oppressive
regime in place. Chávez argues that FMLN stood and fought for democracy, yet did not look to
the United States for their help because the U.S. supported a government that enacted oppressive,
anti-democratic tactics towards civilians. Chávez positively acknowledges the support European
and other Latin American countries, who had social democratic regimes, gave to FMLN. Chávez
states that this support helped the insurgents fight through years of bloodshed which, ended in
the Christian Democrats and the FMLN making a compromise.28 Even though the FMLN wanted
to instill a democratic government, they looked away from U.S. support.
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Mixed reviews of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy showcase the president’s hope to put
human rights first; however, the Cold War, internal differences within his administration,
ineffective management, and his naive approach to installing democracy within several allied
nations ruined the success of his human rights initiatives. Looking further into his foreign
policies, Latin America, specifically El Salvador is one of many examples where the U.S. funded
a politically divided government to insure the spread of democracy as well as halt the
proliferation of communism. The year 1980 was significant for Carter’s human rights agenda
because it not only provided examples of ways Carter presidential duty of applying his human
rights agenda within U.S. foreign policy, but also sheds light on Carter as an activist.
To understand Carter’s immediate reaction to the American churchwomen through an
activist lens, this essay will analyze the year 1980 looking at the various obstacles Carter and his
administration had to face within El Salvador, the United States, and behind White House doors
that both explains the difficulty he endured when putting both human rights and the Cold War as
a priority as well as the continuous restrictions and restraints he had as an activist within a
bureaucratic role leading up to the infamous December murders. The first section of the essay
highlights the internal strife in El Salvador, explaining the military junta’s rise to power in
January and the Carter administration’s initial response to the violence in El Salvador. The
second section, “ Internal Disputes within the Carter Administration (March 1980 – July 1980)”
focuses on the cabinet member’s differing Cold War tactics regarding foreign policy and how it
translated to the disagreements they had about the ways to decrease human rights violations
within El Salvador in response to the murder of Archbishop Óscar Romero. The third section
backs away from U.S. foreign policy in El Salvador and looks at Carter’s unsuccessful
presidential campaign and specifically, how his human rights policy was seen as ineffective to
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the U.S. public, and more so to president-elect Ronald Reagan and his supporters. The fourth
section, “Increasing Divide within the Carter Administration (August 1980 – December 1980),”
refocuses on the growing divide within the Carter Administration regarding the importance of
reducing human rights violations yet, securing a pro-democratic regime in El Salvador. The last
section covers the event of the rape and murder of the American churchwomen and Carter’s
actions and correspondences both publically and privately, and the events that occur after.

Disjointed Junta
Before the Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno (JRG) seized power on October of 1979,
the Salvadoran peoples endured centuries of oppression by elites. These elites were a part of the
las catorce familias, or the fourteen families, who obtained most of the wealth in El Salvador.
Physically these families had euro-centric features and light skin, which indicated their strong
Spanish ancestry. After El Salvador gained its independence in 1821, the European
Enlightenment influenced El Salvador’s agenda of pushing for “progress.” This translated into
putting economic prosperity first where elites invested heavily in raw materials, specifically
coffee. In order to see a sufficient amount of monetary gain, a “subservient, impoverished,
landless rural labor force” was necessary.29 The economic structure in place during the 19th
century reflected their colonial past in that it not only exploited the labor of both Indigenous and
African communities, but also solely benefited elites where their oligarchical structure created
through their economic success, allowed them to control the majority of the wealth and land in
El Salvador, guaranteeing them both economic and political power. With coffee as their main
source of income, their economy thrived; however, rural communities revolted during the latter
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half of the 19th century. While landowners compromised with the labor classes to keep their
labor supply abundant, their original practices of oppression still echoed into the 20th century.30
At the turn of century, elites passed the Agrarian Law of 1907 which gave landowners
physical protection to defend them from laborers as well as strictly regulated when, where, and
how long laborers would work. Furthermore, the placement of rural police pushed the
landowner’s agenda to bully workers and influence judges’ decisions to benefit planters.
Economic prosperity and political power within the first half of the century fell to coffee
planters. In addition, their cordial relations with the military created political and economic
stability for them. On the other hand, most Salvadorans dealt with the inflation of food prices,
high costs of living, and low wages. By 1930, only 0.2% of citizens were considered upper class
and out of a population of 1,443,000, only 118,326 were landowners. With the majority of the
population scrambling to put food on the table, the Salvadoran economy went into decline.
Although some Salvadoran presidents tried to change the structure of El Salvador’s economy and
political stance to benefit more citizens, they failed to permanently change the structure, and kept
the same system in place that oppressed the majority of the rural population for the prosperity of
the elite. 31
During the 20th century, many political parties upheld policies that centered power among
particular elites. President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez from the Partido Nacional ProPatria (1931-1944), maintained power within the elite class and silenced the voices of the
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) by refusing to let elected Communist candidates serve. In
1932, he ordered the military to kill 30,000 Indigenous Salvadorans in response to protests
regarding their harsh working conditions and low wages, an event known as La Matanza. Due to
30
31
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this event, Martínez gained the reputation as “one of the greatest mass murderers in Latin
American history” and after, used oppressive tactics to keep opposition at bay. 32
In response to another upsurge of mass protests during 1960, the United States supported
a new government, the Directorio Civico-Military, to ensure the continuation of the oligarchic
rule to combat Communist influence. Similar to the Partido Nacional Pro-Patria, the Directorio
Civico-Military used its military government to instilled discipline and suppress opposition with
the help of political and financial support from the United States. 33 While the Directorio CivicoMilitary disbanded in 1962, the United States made sure that the junta replacing the previous
government would combat communism just as effectively as the previous regime. The Partido de
Concertación Nacional (PCN) regime furthered suppression from 1962-1979, and its leaders (the
last one being General Carlos Humberto Romero Mena) continued to combat leftist violence.
During Mena’s reign, he created repressive policies, including his infamous reform, Law or the
Defense and Guarantee of the Public Order. 34 This law, decreed in 1977, served to “combat
kidnappings and murders of foreign businessmen and government officials by leftist guerillas.”
35

Two years after this law was passed, kidnappings still occurred. The leftist National
Forces Armed Resistance held British, Japanese, and Salvadoran businessmen ransom for up to
$10 million. This law accounted for 715 arrests with 590 being freed after being beaten, two
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assassinations, and 21 disappearances after being arrested. 36 The two juntas’ motto, “reform
with repression,” received applause from John F. Kennedy for its success in combating leftist
violence, and further inhibiting the spread Communism. 37 The United States, specifically the
CIA played a huge part in training and equipping the Salvadoran military with weapons to ensure
the success of these policies. In addition, the U.S. established the Alliance for Progress initiative,
which encouraged El Salvador’s dependency on foreign aid.38 Due to the government’s
excessive push against “labor militancy and solidarity,” the rise and severity of protests from
other political organizations, especially the Revolutionary Democratic Front conjoined with the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FDR – FMLN) escalated during the late 1960s. 39
The FDR-FMLN was forged from two different organizations. The FDR, or the
Revolutionary Democratic Front was established on March 15, 1980, by the left wing of the
Christian Democratic Party, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the Popular Social
Christian Movement (MPSC), and the Revolutionary Coordinating Council of the Masses
(CRM), which was made up of several other organizations. Their agenda aligned with increasing
nationalization and collectivization within huge sectors of the economy as well as replacing the
military and police forces with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) who
would not allow foreign entities to intervene during their revolutionary process and, would
ensure liberation for all people. 40 The FMLN, named after the leader of the 1932 peasant
uprising, was a leftist guerrilla organization comprised of five different organizations. Its main
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goal was to “reverse decades of suffering and more than 50 years of military dictatorship.” 41 The
FMLN’s tactics included the strategies of Vietnamese-style People’s war and Che Guevara’s
theories of guerilla warfare. They also as carried out a “campaign of terrorism.” Their primary
goals included transitioning their authoritarian government to a democratic one, ending
government oppression, and establishing land reform.42 While the FMLN was more MarxistLeninist leaning, the FDR took on a more popular-democratic ideology. Together they
represented “different instrumentalities of the revolution” but they both shared the same agenda
to foster liberation in El Salvador.43 The leftist guerrilla organizations cared for and were made
up of the poor, the peasants, and protesters who were tired of a regime that did not benefit them.
Leftists’ actions against the regime ranged from protests to kidnapping and torturing
Salvadoran elites and foreign businessmen. Some activities that leftist guerillas used to oppose
the regime included violent protests in upper class neighborhoods, committing arson, kidnapping
specific individuals, and bombing different regions of El Salvador. Leftist guerillas primarily
pushed for terror and guerilla warfare against the Salvadoran government and its supporters.
With these tactics they intended to expedite political, social, and economic change that would
serve the people, not solely the elites. By using these tactics and conducting combat operations,
they were able to successfully take control of certain areas within El Salvador.44 However, their
victories were met with more repression and violence from PCN.
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In response, the regime unleashed Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN), a
paramilitary organization whose main goal included working with police to terrorize rural
populations to hinder leftist guerilla violence against the regime and their supporters.45 ORDEN
members were directly ordered to murder suspects accused of preaching communist ideology as
well as participate in death squad activities towards people they saw as “subversives.” The
tension between the regime’s repression and the growth in opposition continued to build into the
1970s. 46 Opposition of PCN did not just come from leftist guerillas, it also came from moderate
political organizations.
The Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), opposed the
tactics used by PCN. Their “centrist” views gained them popularity during the 1960s and early
70s where José Napoleón Duarte and Guillermo Ungo won the 1972 presidential election. Yet,
the military committed fraud to win the election, in order to beat the PDC, with close relations to
the military in power till 1979.47 On October 15, 1979, Colonel Adolfo Majano and his
supporters, who were against the harsh military tactics practiced by rightist, conservative military
officers, overthrew the PCN. However, Majano’s coup d’état did not last long. Majano wanted to
“[focus] on sharing power with key power centers in the attempt to establish a unity of effort
around the military’s proclamation to institute reform objectives.”48 His goals of modifying the
government’s practices did not interest powerful politicians. Involved groups wanted to either
maintain present reforms or implement more radical reforms. Then in January 1980, the Junta
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Revolucionaria de Gobierno (JRG) was created, which put PDC in power with the existing
military, including Majano. 49
The JRG united groups that were traditionally political enemies. The Partido Demócrata
Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party) wanted to create a “centrist solution” for El Salvador’s
situation. On the political spectrum, the Christian Democratic Party members occupied either a
centrist or left of center space. While they took a centrist view, members ranged from
conservative- to liberal-leaning with their core values and ideology stemming from U.S.- and
European-based education and values.50 This translated into a policy focus which called for
nationalization of banks and redistribution of large estates, as well as agrarian reform and
democratization.51 Within the JRG, the PDC’s role consisted of sharing seats alongside the
current military officers in place then due to a longstanding connection with the old elites. The
military’s ideology differed from the Christian Democrats in that they thrived on oligarchical
power. Many military members held conservative and right wing ideology which consisted of
suppressing any notion of revolution because it threatened their hegemony. Their use of death
squads and practice of tormenting any opposition within their regime was a tactic they heavily
relied on for decades. A change in government was not necessarily going to shift their views. 52
The creation of the JRG elicited mixed responses from the Salvadoran people. The
initiatives the JRG proposed—to end the repression of civilians, create a democratic political
system, and implement policies to directly help the poor—were for the benefit of all people, but
many felt that the military was unlikely to stray from their past tactics. 53

49

Ibid.
William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 36.
51
John Beverley, “El Salvador,” 63.
52
William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 34.
53
Ibid., 40.
50

23

While the public slowly welcomed the new regime, the military faced internal fractures.
Junta members held different ideologies reflecting the beliefs of two of the colonels in charge.
Some members followed Colonel Adolfo Arnaldo Majano whose interest laid in achieving
radical political, social, and economic reforms. Others looked up to Colonel Jaime Abdul
Gutiérrez who believed in creating and executing moderate reforms. Other members followed
the ideology of Robert D'Aubuisson who wanted to continue relations with the oligarchy.54
Powerful contributors to the junta included Minister of Defense José Guillermo García and José
Napoleon Duarte who was the civil-military junta leader during the JRG’s reign. While the
Christian Democratic Party seemed to have a prominent role at the beginning of the revolution,
their left-leaning agenda was hindered due to their minority status within the JRG itself. In
addition to the Christian Democratic Party’s lack of voice within the government, the junta
struggled to maintain a united agenda due to differing political ideologies and tactics. Ongoing
violence from leftist as well as rightists continued.
While tensions heightened within the JRG and leftist violence erupted, the U.S. publicly
responded positively to the new regime in place. During the presidencies of Richard Nixon and
Gerald Ford, the U.S. had pursued containment in Latin America. Containment was proposed by
George Keenan who felt that in order to combat the spread of Communism, it had to literally be
contained, which meant halting organizations and people who were trying to spread this
ideology. Multiple American administrations pursued containment within Latin America, where
the U.S. supported and installed governments that would primarily fight Communist influence.
This translated into these regimes brutally suppressing leftist thought and ideology through
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physical violence and torture, which was even recognized and condemned by President Jimmy
Carter.55
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in January 1977, his agenda broke away
from this model by focusing primarily on putting forth post-Cold War policies in developing
countries—implementing humane policies--while preserving American interests. 56 Carter
further condemned U.S. support of dictatorships as well as the containment policy imposed by
previous U.S. presidents due to its un-American values.57 Within the context of pushing for
human rights, the JRG’s values and intentions seemed “pro-democratic” in the Carter
administration’s eyes because the junta sought to actively halt continuous torture and
assassinations putting forth policies to end suppression of Salvadoran citizens and creating left
leaning agrarian reforms. These agrarian reforms would also hue to the effect of keeping leftist
insurgents from causing instability within the Salvadoran government that could sacrifice U.S.
interests there.
Outside of human rights concerns, the main priority for the Carter administration after the
1979 coup was to protect U.S. national interests, specifically U.S. dependents within El
Salvador. While these dependents, mostly American missionaries and Peace Corps members,
were not directly threatened by leftist insurgents, pulling them out of El Salvador could weaken
the reputation the U.S. had locally. For the United States, the coup decreased the power the U.S.
had within El Salvador, and the only way to protect national interest was through supporting the
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regime. National Security Council Staff, Robert Pastor iterated these concerns to Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, in a memorandum written in
December of 1979:
Withdrawal of our dependents is the worst thing we could do now; it would
completely demoralize the already beleaguered government; it would be
interpreted as a U.S. loss of confidence in the Junta and would be a significant
morale boost for the terrorists. There are indications that the Junta has finally
decided to bite the bullet and fight the terrorists. I have asked DOD to begin
working on a range of alternative ways we can assist them to do this job. […] By
withdrawing our people, we will detract from the Junta’s efforts to control the
left, and ultimately increase the danger for all Americans in El Salvador. We
should not panic. 58

During this moment, the Carter Administration believed that the JRG would hinder the military
from using violent suppression tactics against Salvadoran citizens. Unfortunately, the brewing
problems proved otherwise.
Within the first two months of 1980, the Christian Democratic Party started to lose the
little influence they had within the JRG. Left-leaning government officials began to resign from
the JRG in March due to the government’s inability to stop the repression of civilians. This
decision was influenced by the February 1980 assassination of Attorney General Mario Zamora
by a right-winged death squad leader. His assassination created an even bigger rift because
Zamora was the main official to bridge a relationship between the Christian Democrats and the
left. In response to the assassination the remainder of the left-leaning Christian Democrats
resigned and formed the Popular Social Christian Party, a group that publicly opposed the JRG
and its actions.59
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In the White House, the administration decided that continuing to support the JRG and
providing the junta military aid was the best option to keep the violence at bay. As highlighted in
a letter from the national security advisor to President Carter in January of 1980, Brzezinski
wanted to bribe the Salvadoran military with aid from the United States. He also wanted to speak
with Italy to give the JRG helicopters for their military. Both of these moves were an effort to
pressure the JRG to pursue moderate policies. 60 However, other voices in the administration
understood they could not give the JRG the idea that the U.S. would always sympathize with
them out of a knee-jerk reaction to communism:
[The JRG] have found nothing but US support in the past, particularly when they
scream “Communist.” Now, we don’t seem to be responding to their “red cape,”
and they are growing frantic. Still, according to most people, they feel that there
are sympathetic ears in the Administration (principally the Pentagon and
[Brzezinski]) and outside (business, in Congress, Republicans) and that eventually
that side will come to their rescue. They also believe that Afghanistan and cold
war-like tensions mean that the probability of an early rescue operation has
increased dramatically. We must disabuse them of this illusion quickly. 61
Regardless of the concerns of some of the need to disabuse the junta of a knee-jerk American
reaction to support non-Communists under all circumstances, fears of a leftist victory in El
Salvador still held sway for others in Washington. In a memorandum written to President Carter,
Brzezinski clearly acknowledged the issue regarding right-winged violence and the strategy to
bring in progressive leaders to slowly influence the military as a whole. However he and Robert
White, the ambassador of El Salvador, felt that the only course of action that could be taken at
this time was to agree with the current government in place, even though violence was on the
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rise. If they stopped support, they believed there could be a Marxist victory within El Salvador.
This was “unacceptable” for White.62
While the United States did not agree with the JRG’s actions, they understood that in
order to keep their influence within El Salvador, they had to bribe the military. The Carter
Administration settled on a budget proposal for $5.7 million in emergency military aid in which
they said would help “strengthen the Army’s key reforms.” 63 While this military assistance was
labeled as “nonlethal,” this military aid included 7,500 CS tear gas grenades, 250 combat
grenades, and an unspecified number of grenade launchers. This was pushed to congress on
March 25, 1980. 64 By providing military assistance, they were funneling more power to the
JRG, specifically military strength, which is what the JRG wanted.
While the Carter administration’s decision to consistently provide economic and military
aid to a regime that continued implementing repressive tactics against leftists and civilians may
be seen as incongruous with his calls for incentivizing human rights, Carter and his advisors felt
that bribing the military was their only choice to instill stability and keep U.S. political influence
within the region. They understood that the regime was inhumane and violent and went against
their human rights agenda, but due to the fact that they were in the midst of the Cold War, letting
insurgents bring a Marxist revolution to El Salvador was not an option. This is the first example
of the Carter administration struggling with balancing Carter’s human rights agenda and Cold
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War ideology. They had a duty to bring human rights to El Salvador, but also had a
responsibility to look out for national interest, which meant combating Communism within the
region. The White House believed that their bribe would decrease the violence and make the
JRG move towards a democratic regime.
But instead, the violence escalated:
In the bright morning sunlight of March 24 1980, a car stopped outside the
Church of the Divine Providence. A lone gunman stepped out, unhurried. Resting
his rifle on the car door, he aimed carefully down the long aisle to where El
Salvador's archbishop, Oscar Arnulfo Romero, was saying mass. A single shot
rang out. Romero staggered and fell. The blood pumped from his heart, soaking
the little white disks of scattered host.65

Internal Disputes within the Carter Administration (March 1980 - July 1980)

When Óscar Romero became the fourth Archbishop of El Salvador in 1977, many
progressive priests were worried that his conservative ideology would affect his care for the
poor. However, on March 22, 1977, a progressive Jesuit, Father Rutilio Grande, whom he saw as
a colleague and friend was assassinated by security forces and this caused Romero to become
increasingly more outspoken against the regime.66 The Archbishop stopped all appearances at
government events, which would normally help legitimize the regime, to show his opposition.67
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He also delivered sermons where he called out the brutality and violence inflicted against the
majority of the Salvadoran population. A day before he was assassinated, the Archbishop
specifically called on military members to cease their crude actions:
No government can be efficient without the support of the people, least of all
when it tries to enforce them through blood and pain….I would like to make a
special call to the men in the Army….Brothers, you are from our people, killing
your own peasant brothers, and before being given an order to kill by a man, the
law of God must prevail, which says: Do not kill. . . . No soldier is obliged to
obey an order against the law of God. . . . An immoral law, nobody has to
accomplish it. . . . It is time to recover your consciousness and to obey your
consciousness before a sinful order. . . . In the name of God, and in the name of
this suffering people whose laments rise up to heaven, every day more
tumultuous, I entreat and beg you, I order you in the name of God: Stop the
repression!68
His opposition against the government, and his support for the “peasant brothers” was clear.
These “peasant brothers” would soon make up the majority of the FDR-FMLN, a primary
leftist guerrilla organization that opposed the JRG. Archbishop Romero saw the JRG’s
continuing neglect and violence towards the poor, and believed that the FMLN were the only
ones in El Salvador who could fix this ongoing atrocity. As Romero’s support for the FDRFMLN’s goal of achieving liberation, democracy, and justice threatened his life within El
Salvador, he attempted to seek support from the United States, who he thought had authoritative
power to stop the JRG. In a letter to the White House, he expressed the worsening atrocities that
would occur if President Carter continued to provide military aid to the junta:
I am very worried by the news that the government of the United States is
studying a form of abetting the arming of El Salvador by sending military teams
and advisors to “train three Salvadoran Batallions in Logistics, Communications,
and Intelligence.” If this information from the newspapers is correct, the
contribution of your government instead of promoting greater justice and peace in
68
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El Salvador will without doubt sharpen the injustice and repression against the
organizations of the people which repeatedly have been struggling to gain respect
for their most fundamental human rights. 69
In response, the Carter Administration wrote an apathetic letter stating that supporting the junta
was the only path that would create peaceful change.70
While it seems that the United States just ignored Archbishop Romero’s request, it turns
out that the United States actively sought to halt Romero’s role of opposing the junta by using
the Vatican to pressure Romero. The Carter Administration, specifically National Security
Adviser Brzezinski, wrote a letter directly to Pope John Paul II addressing the danger of
Romero’s leftist views and his impatience with the junta’s progress. Furthermore, Brzezinski
urged the Pope to intervene in Romero’s outbursts because the church should play a
“constructive and responsible role” during this process. While it is not clear if this letter was
actually sent to the Pope, the intention was clearly to pressure Romero to not disrupt the U.S.’s
plan to support the junta in the name of creating stability within the regime. The U.S. took the
initiative to actively stop Romero’s plea for human rights because it conflicted with U.S. national
interest. While this can simply be seen as the U.S. being solely concerned with creating a facade
of stability for their own national interest during the Cold War, it might have also served as a
tactic to create trust between the JRG and the U.S. By creating trust, the U.S. could increase its
influence over El Salvador and later, be able to push their human rights agenda on their terms,
not the leftists. While Romero did end up meeting with the Pope, his responses to the violation of

69

“Text of Archbishop’s Letter to President Carter,” February 19, 1980, National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 339 (The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.).
70
Betty Glad, Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of
American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 250.
31

human rights within El Salvador did not change. 71 The Archbishop’s continued efforts to
publicize and criticize military tactics and right-wing death squads ultimately cost him his life.72
Archbishop Óscar Romero’s assassination created shock waves both in El Salvador and
abroad. His martyrdom was venerated by his community in his home country as well as globally.
Thousands of Romero’s followers visited his tomb. Many expressed their love and respect for
him after his death and he gained a wide following from progressives and met with hostility from
several groups during his lifetime. Romero’s death was similar to previous cases in El Salvador
where priests, nuns, teachers, and lay workers were beaten, tortured, killed, and arrested by the
government; all these cases, including Romero’s, were not investigated nor was anyone held
accountable.73
The U.S.’s public and private response to Archbishop Romero’s assassination differed
greatly. On one hand, the United States was surprised and immediately condemned the killing.
However their real concern laid on how to maintain the stability of this so called “prodemocratic” regime now that the Archbishop, who fought consistently for human rights, had died
at the altar. Publicly, President Jimmy Carter denounced the assassination of the archbishop
while positively speaking of a regime that made Archbishop Romero outspoken in the first place:
I strongly condemn the tragic assassination of Archbishop Oscar A. Romero of
San Salvador yesterday. It is a shocking and unconscionable act. Archbishop
Romero spoke for the poor of El Salvador, where their voices had been ignored
for too long. He spoke for change and for social justice, which his nation so
desperately needs. Terrorism cannot silence the archbishop’s message of
compassion. It cannot and should not intimidate those who seek social justice and
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democracy. The United States trusts that the Government of El Salvador will
move swiftly and effectively to bring the archbishop’s assassins to justice. 74
Robert White, the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador attended Romero’s funeral. His presence was
praised by peasants and the poor, yet not the elites nor the JRG.75 This was the beginning of a
split within the administration where Robert White and the rest of the Carter Administration
developed different approaches on how to stop the violent tactics of the JRG over the course of
1980.
As for the U.S.’s private response, the first priority within the administration was to
stabilize the JRG after the tragedy. According to Robert White, initially, Salvadorans did not
trust the JRG, and the only reason they were still in power was due to the “lack of an effective
opposition.” 76 Yet, Romero’s death could be used as a symbol for the poor, the moderate left,
and the religious community to effectively mobilize together and take over the JRG. White
indicated this may not be the case and would have to wait and see what happens. Due to this
potential threat, the administration started meeting with JRG leaders to come up with ways to
reduce this threat: stopping the repression in the first place. 77
Two weeks after the Archbishop’s death, the Carter Administration started to create and
execute action plans to ensure the JRG decreased their use of violent tactics to suppress leftist
guerillas. An April 4th memorandum from Robert Pastor, a part of the National Security Council
Staff to Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs David Aaron mentioned that Robert
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White’s and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Jim Cheek’s
meetings with leaders from the JRG to discuss the reduction of repression through a “land of the
tiller” program seemed successful.78 However in a letter from Robert White on April 12th, it was
clear that these ongoing meetings with the all of JRG’s members except from Colonel Majano
were not effective because left-leaning leaders of the JRG were being manipulated by right-wing
politicians. 79 The manipulation or intellectual domination from right-wing politicians came to
fruition through left-wing leaders’ inability to influence the regime. In addition, the leftist
guerrilla violence increased in rural areas where the guerrillas forcefully prevented peasant
farmers from planting.80 In this letter, it becomes apparent that the JRG was undergoing a shift
away from the left-centrist view the U.S. wanted implemented.81
In addition to the internal disputes within the JRG and escalating issues between the JRG
and the United States, conflicts within the administration ensued as both leftist and JRG violence
escalated over the next few months. On May 26, 1980, Robert White wrote a long telegram to
the Department of State explaining the turmoil that occurred in El Salvador after Archbishop
Romero’s death. The government had survived a right-wing coup d’état attempt by Roberto
D'Aubuisson as well as violent uprisings by the ultra-left on several occasions. In addition, the
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Christian Democratic Party had forged a pull-out ultimatum. 82 As far as the plan of reducing
violence however, the situation had only worsened:
We seem as far as ever from reducing the violence from the ultra-right. On the
contrary, brutal murders of anyone suspected of liberal views, even Christian
Democrats, produce a harvest of mutilated bodies by the roadside every morning.
Security forces excesses against peasant villages have not declined either and in
fact seem to be on the increase. Far left violence has declined in the cities but is
on the rise in the countryside where all-out efforts are being made to sabotage the
land reform and intimidate the peasantry into refusing to plant this [year’s] crops.
The national economy is already in serious straits and the failure to plant on a
large scale could produce economic collapse.83
He further recommended that in order to de-escalate the situation, the perpetrators of the
violence needed to be held accountable. As White noted, while the left does use violent tactics,
the real ongoing violence stemmed from the ultra-right in the government. By siding with the
JRG, White bluntly stated that the U.S. was backing a government that did not stand for what the
U.S. preached and that was opposed to what the Christian Democrats stood for: democracy.
In addition, Amb. White pointed to the U.S.’s neglect of human rights policy, the
signature policy that President Carter had put forth in the first place. As he wrote:
Those who look on this mayhem with tolerance, believing that the terror will be
worth its cost if it prevents people from taking part in rebel activities, leave out a
crucial factor. The target of the rightwing slaughter is not only or principally the
extreme left but anyone who is against the oligarchy/military combine, including
PDC members and their supporters of the present government. At least twenty
Christian Democrat leaders have died at the hands of the paramilitary groups.84
With so much focus on defeating a Marxist rebellion in El Salvador, the United States had been
too tolerant of the human rights violations. White brought to light the atrocities against the left,
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but also the Christian Democrat Party leaders who wanted to create change and democracy.
White’s plan of action included the U.S. realigning the High Command of the JRG where both
Colonel Majano and Colonel Abdul Gutierrez were allies instead of enemies. Furthermore, both
the colonels needed to end any political alliance with the right. In addition, the U.S. itself needed
to cut ties with the ultra-right as well, which primarily included D’Aubuisson. As for any type of
military assistance program, White suggested this decision should be halted until the
administration is “clear on who [they’re] supporting and why and where such a decision will take
[them].”85 In a sign of just how divided the executive branch was becoming on El Salvador
policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s and others within the Department of State and the Department of
Defense took on actions in El Salvador that differed from White’s recommendations.
Brzezinski’s tactics shifted early August when considering the Department of State’s
view, which asserted that it was unrealistic for the JRG to meet all criteria for support set out by
Robert White.86 The criteria, which White established in June of 1980 to incentivize the JRG to
improve their human rights, included:
—the United States is prepared to lease six U.S. Army UH–1H helicopters to El
Salvador;
—this offer is made on the understanding that the military will take specific
measures to reduce and effectively bring under control the violence participated in
by elements of the military;
—as evidence of our good faith, the necessary training of Salvadoran pilots will
begin (at schools in Panama or the U.S.) as promptly as students can be identified.
The training will take approximately two months;
—provided the military take specific measures that effectively reduce
indiscriminate violence for which they are responsible or with which they are
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associated during the next two months, the helicopters would be delivered as soon
as the training is completed.
The Ambassador also recommends that a small survey team from SOUTHCOM
be brought into El Salvador for a few days to assess the type, amount, and
optimum location of helicopter training required, and that a three-man logistics
and maintenance support team be assigned to the Military Group for
approximately one year.87
Brzezinski may have been neutral with the Department of State’s comment but either way
believed that bribing the JRG with helicopters and training was a necessity, even before progress
was made. While there were no stark disagreements between White’s and other ideas on how to
handle the JRG, it is notable to see that both the Department of State and Brzezinski were more
concerned with using incentives to play a prominent role in controlling the situation, while White
was more focused on human rights. He wants the JRG to prove their care for human rights before
giving the JRG what they desire. This small disagreement sowed the seeds that later grew into a
bitter feud.
The actions taken by Carter and his administration in El Salvador during the first six
months of 1980 reflect American fears of a Marxist Revolution as well as the urgency of halting
human rights violations implemented by the JRG. Unlike previous Cold War presidents,
President Jimmy Carter’s primary foreign policy agenda was on creating post-cold war policies
that bettered the conditions developing countries endured due to proxy wars between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, his foreign policy agenda in El Salvador was not as
successful as planned. While his administration attempted to alter their policies to crack down on
the right-wing sector of the JRG in El Salvador, his actions had already proved damaging to his
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reputation. Back in the United States, his reputation went from an honest, moral man this country
needed to a weak, communist-sympathizing president not fit for office.

Carter’s Presidential Campaign (July 1980 - September 1980)

During July of 1980, one of President Carter’s primary concerns outside of El Salvador
included his Presidential re-election. The promises of creating a foreign policy agenda that would
primarily care for human rights had faltered within El Salvador, and this affected the way the
public and politicians in El Salvador and the United States viewed him. This was significantly
different from four years earlier when many saw Carter’s foreign policy as a fresh new start for
the United States to practice values that had been lost in the midst of the Cold War. 88
When President Jimmy Carter campaigned for president in 1976, his foreign policies
exemplified values that aligned with President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism, including
putting peace, human rights, self-determination, and cooperation at the forefront.89 His push for
democratic idealism as well making human rights a central theme for his foreign policy perfectly
counteracted President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s foreign policy of
realism. During his campaign, Carter spoke against the “excessive assertion of American
governmental power, whether in Vietnam or later in the Watergate and CIA scandals.”90 Rather
than maintaining secrecy when it came to foreign policy, Carter wanted to drift away from this
practice and pursue open and honest diplomacy that implemented values such as human rights
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and democracy when meeting and working with foreign nations.91 While the idea of
implementing human rights as the primary focus for a foreign policy agenda was uncharted
territory, Carter’s morals played a huge role in his policies and helped him win the 1976 election
by 1.7 million votes and an electoral college lead of 57. 92 Yet by 1980, Carter’s popularity
dwindled not only within the United States, but around the world.
Within some Central American countries, many traditionally right leaning groups,
including businessmen, landowners, and military officers disdained Carter for his policies which
they believed took away the privilege, wealth, and rights they had accumulated over the last
century.93 Furthermore, they saw his policies as “weak” and “wrongheaded” and went so far to
say that Carter had pro-Communist intentions. 94 Beyond the elites, civilians and leftist guerrillas
were upset that the U.S. did not seem to care about their human rights. Leftist guerrillas,
specifically the FMLN understood that U.S. military aid would only give the JRG more
authoritative and military power over the rest of the region, so the FMLN took time to strike U.S.
military personnel and military training centers funded and overseen by the U.S. government.95
To the FMLN, it was clear that the U.S. did not intend to support them due to the continuation of
military aid during the first six months of 1980.
Within the United States, Carter also earned a negative reputation from American public
and U.S. public officials. While Carter was clearly not as secretive as Nixon and Kissinger, the
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U.S. public felt that he was hiding a part of the truth when pushing for military aid that his
administration labeled as “nonlethal” just a week after Archbishop Romero’s assassination. In a
Washington Post article, journalists called out the administration’s shady tactics that helped twist
the truth around the continuation of military aid to the JRG:
What [Mr. Franklin D. Kramer, Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs] neglected to disclose in his public testimony was that the aid package in
fact included combat-related equipment that stretches the definition of “nonlethal”
beyond credibility. The Defense Security Assistance Agency has provided
Congress with a list of items in the military aid proposal that was more detailed
than the one made public by Mr. Kramer. The members of Congress who saw the
list--it was given to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee-accepted the “nonlethal” designation despite the nature of the equipment. When
this gear reaches the field, however, any distinction between lethal and nonlethal
will have been lost. As repression by Salvadoran security forces escalates daily in
the countryside, this gear becomes vital to the junta’s waging of
counterinsurgency war. 96
The U.S. public was not only aware of the JRG’s repression, but also understood that military aid
was going to make matters worse. The military equipment that had been purposely taken out of
Kramer’s testimony included tear gas grenades, tear gas grenade launchers, combat radios, and
night-vision devices, which could be easily defined as lethal, or used for nighttime weapons
targeting. In addition, the administration had asked Congress for more overtly combat-related
equipment for the JRG including helicopters, jeeps, patrol boats, aircraft engines, and parachutes.
Further, this amount of military aid funneled from the United States to El Salvador did not
include private arms transactions from U.S. companies, transactions that had not been restricted.
The deceit and secrecy that Carter practiced negatively impacted his own morals. It also
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negatively affected his foreign policy agenda that promised to care for human rights and to
practice democracy within other regions.
On the other side of the issue domestically, conservatives felt that Carter’s policy in El
Salvador has been too soft. Roberto D'Aubuisson and Alfredo Mena Lagos, Salvadoran
businessmen, successfully lobbied Congress to get conservatives’ support in Congress and to
constantly ridicule and undermine Carter’s policy in El Salvador. 97 Roger Fontaine, Republican
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy advisor on Latin America, criticized
Carter’s “tolerance of ideological pluralism” where the president had not been successful in
combating the issues ensuing in El Salvador except for accepting of some Marxist ideology.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during Reagan’s first term as
president, expanded on this notion by stating that Carter and his officials only seemed to
accommodate people who were similar to the Russians and the Cubans.98
In contrast to Carter, Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy agenda
focused on putting U.S. national security at the top of its list.99 As a staunch anti-Communist,
Reagan felt that Carter’s policies deviated from effectively seeking to win the Cold War. In order
to put U.S. national security first and defeat Communism, Reagan and his campaign agreed to
build up military and economic strength.100 His goal of reasserting American power–which
Carter had weakened in many peoples’ eyes—made him a strong candidate for the 1980 election.
His primary foreign policy goals regarding Central America included preventing the expansion
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of Soviet influence and promoting democracy through a mixture of diplomacy and both
economic and military assistance. 101
Regarding his presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan was popular for some conservative
officials and voters based on his policies, but among some constituencies Reagan’s popularity
had more to do with Carter’s failures. Reagan’s position in the polls during 1980 mostly reflected
the successes of his attack on Carter’s failures during his first term.102 In debates and on the
campaign trail, Reagan consistently highlighted Carter’s domestic and foreign policy failings. In
a presidential debate on October 28, 1980, Reagan explicitly displayed Carter’s failure to better
the U.S. economy by stating the huge rise in inflation rates, from 4.8% to 12.7% as well as the
eight million American citizens out of work. He then resorted to highlight that the government is
to blame for these obstacles:
[Carter] has blamed the people for inflation, OPEC, he has blamed the Federal
Reserve system, he has blamed the lack of productivity of the American people,
he has then accused the people of living too well and that we must share in
scarcity, we must sacrifice and get used to doing with less. We don't have
inflation because the people are living too well. We have inflation because the
Government is living too well.103
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As for foreign policy, Reagan added that while world peace was important, Carter’s way of
pursuing it was ineffective. Due to this inefficiency on Carter’s part, using force might be
necessary:
And I'm only here to tell you that I believe with all my heart that our first priority
must be world peace, and that use of force is always and only a last resort, when
everything else has failed, and then only with regard to our national security.
Now, I believe, also, that this meeting this mission, this responsibility for
preserving the peace, which I believe is a responsibility peculiar to our country,
and that we cannot shirk our responsibility as a leader of the free world because
we're the only ones that can do it. Therefore, the burden of maintaining the peace
falls on us. And to maintain that peace requires strength. America has never
gotten in a war because we were too strong. We can get into a war by letting
events get out of hand, as they have in the last three and a half years under the
foreign policies of this Administration of Mr. Carter's, until we're faced each time
with a crisis. 104
Rather than critiquing his individual policies, a lot of Reagan’s critiques focused on
Carter as an individual. When Carter rebutted Reagan in a presidential debate regarding
Reagan’s disagreement of the SALT II treaty, saying that Reagan’s views on the SALT II treaty
would resume a dangerous nuclear arms race, Reagan criticized, or better yet used
condescending language, to respond to Carter’s rebuttal:
I know the President's supposed to be replying to me, but sometimes, I have a
hard time in connecting what he's saying, with what I have said or what my
positions are. I sometimes think he's like the witch doctor that gets mad when a
good doctor comes along with a cure that'll work.105
While Reagan had a charismatic persona on screen, he was guarded during individual interviews
with reporters and maintained one sentence responses. In an interview with the Atlantic reporter
James Conaway, Reagan responded with one word answer. However, when Conaway asked
Reagan to compare himself to Carter as “amateurs in the White House,” his expression
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brightened.106 Reagan’s campaign strategy during the 1980 election was to consistently
recognize the failings of Carter’s policies and create the perception that he was what the United
States needed.
Overall, President Carter was bombarded from both the left and right in El Salvador and
in the United States during the campaign year in 1980. His actions regarding his human rights
policy were not successful enough to many, nor was his concern for U.S. national security strong
enough. He was stuck being unsuccessful in both aspects because he could not fully commit to
one agenda; the Cold War made it hard for his human rights agenda to go forth in lieu of national
security concerns, and vice versa. His human rights agenda and the U.S. Cold War mentality
were essentially contradictory. On one hand we have an agenda that pushed for civilians to be
allowed basics rights such as thinking for themselves, yet on the other hand, these civilians could
only have one type of ideology, one that benefitted the U.S.’s initiative for liberal capitalist
democracy. As Schmitz and Walker highlight, Carter was aware that his foreign policy had
internal contradictions and complexities due to the nature of the two policies he was trying to
balance and merge. 107 With his contradictory agenda’s, not one of his policies could possibly
become successful. This contradiction proved to be fodder for a mass critique of Carter. The reelection campaign exposed his failures in a place where politics were displayed in a black and
white fashion, rather than the complexity of the situations Carter had dealt with since his first
term. Carter’s weak re-election campaign and the critique he receives during the later months of
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1980 not only diminished his reputation as an effective leader, but also created a further divide
within the administration on how to be successful in El Salvador.

Increasing Divide within the Carter Administration (August 1980 - December 1980)
The election added tension to the Carter Administration: Carter’s ineffectiveness at
stopping leftist insurgencies and right-winged violence in El Salvador created an even deeper
divide within the administration. In June, the administration as a whole agreed to lease the JRG
six U.S. Army UH-1H helicopters and supply a two month U.S. military training for Salvadoran
pilots if the military would take certain steps to reduce their violent actions.108 However, the
administration had split views on the quality and tangibility of evidence needed for the JRG to
receive military aid. Ambassador Robert White wanted the JRG to receive aid solely after the
JRG made substantial progress in decreasing human rights violations. On the other hand, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security
Council (NSC) were flexible with the evidence the JRG provided regarding human rights, and
focused more on providing the JRG aid to protect them from leftist violence, who White,
contradictorily, did not see as the culprit of the violence.
In July of 1980, Ambassador Robert White met with JRG leaders, Colonel Adolfo
Majano, Colonel Jaime Gutiérrez, civil military leader José Duarte, and Minister of Defense José
Guillermo García to create a permanent plan that would ultimately be the deciding factor of
whether they would receive U.S. military assistance or not.109 While the JRG leaders and
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Ambassador White did come to agreement on the specific actions the JRG would take in order to
receive military assistance, the Department of State felt that the proposed criteria was ultimately
unrealistic and the JRG should receive military assistance if they were committed to trying to
halt the violence. 110
In a memorandum sent from Brzezinski to President Carter, the national security advisor
agreed that the Department of State believed that the JRG’s ability to successfully complete all
criteria (and furthermore have tangible proof of this completion) was impractical. While
Brzezinski did not have a specific opinion on the Department of State’s position on this matter,
he believed that the military assistance promised was enough of an incentive for the JRG to agree
with the criteria proposed by Ambassador White to reduce right-wing violence. During the
process of producing and executing a plan to decrease violence, President Carter insisted on a
detailed description of the “specific measures to judge human rights progress.” 111 So even at this
stage, Carter was at the least partially committed to pushing a human rights agenda. While the
administration, with Carter’s permission, was using military assistance as an incentive to
encourage the JRG to halt its repression tactics against leftist insurgents and innocent civilians,
he was also making sure that the JRG was taking tangible and realistic measures to permanently
reduce violence. Carter did not want to half-heartedly suppress bloodshed for a short period of
time for the U.S.’s benefit.
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Overall, the differing opinions within the administration on the strategy taken to reduce
right winged violence was specifically focused on the judgement of whether the leftist insurgents
posed a legitimate threat or not. As stated within a memorandum between Frank Kramer, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown in early September 1980, different sectors within the administration have
“fundamentally different perceptions as to the nature of the problem”. 112 White’s perspective
was that the leftist insurgents did not constitute a real threat in El Salvador because they did not
have outside help, specifically from Cubans. Therefore, the main task at hand was to push the
JRG to hold down right-winged members from acting violently. In contrast, the DOD, DOS,
NSC, and Brzezinski relied on the fact that while the right was an immediate threat, the left also
was considered a “serious threat.” 113 Moreover it was a threat to the JRG’s pro-democratic
regime. This view emphasized that the military needed more time to fulfill the criteria proposed
by White. Even though both views did compromise on the offer of giving helicopters to the JRG,
White was more concerned with human rights conditions whereas others focused on the political,
economic and military value of giving helicopters to the JRG’s military.
On a larger scale, this reflects the struggle between what the U.S. deemed most
important: human rights or the threat of a leftist takeover. Kramer ended his letter by stating that
policy makers should still debate if increased military aid to the junta is needed because guerillas
still pose a threat to the pro-democratic regime the U.S. was attempting to stabilize. In addition,
Kramer foregrounded White’s persistence on persuading armed forces to practice the values of
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democratization, human rights, and honesty rather than repression, excessive violence, and
corruption in order for this regime to survive. The differing views on human rights however did
not end with compromise. Rather, officials who opposed White’s stance sought other ways to get
their perspective heard and considered, specifically Defense Secretary Harold Brown and NSC
staffer Robert Pastor.
Harold Brown’s concern for leftist violence peaked on October 24th when he informed
Brzezinski that he believed the U.S. was “not providing the right kind of security assistance.” 114
Brown spoke about the importance of the JRG’s success in order for the U.S. to achieve political
and economic success. Within this memorandum, Brown emphasized the many materials the
U.S. could provide to the JRG to minimize the leftist threat including specialized training in
border control, intelligence collection, and special operations to help develop capabilities for
disrupting the flow of arms as well as improve basic counterinsurgency techniques. He even
suggested putting civic-action teams (military personnel) in civilian clothes to help assist with
roads, agriculture, and public health concerns while simultaneously countering the increasing
dominance of guerilla groups in rural areas. Brown was aware that having military personnel
within El Salvador was a political matter and already had a plan of how to reduce U.S.
visibility.115
For his part, Robert Pastor undercut Robert White and the Salvadoran Embassy by
meeting with Colonel Garcia, who was known to “symbolize repression and military
continuismo in El Salvador.” The two met in private to discuss future U.S.-JRG relations
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regarding military assistance.116 Robert White’s letter to the Department of State illustrated the
frustration and hurt he felt for purposefully not being informed of this meeting. White felt this
meeting also publicly undermined his knowledge and expertise on the matters that happened in
El Salvador. In addition, this move on Robert Pastor’s part reflected badly on the public image of
the United States. It showed weakness and divide among Carter’s officials and displayed U.S.
support for the right, which implies neglect of the human rights policy Carter preached during his
presidency. 117
The push for issuing military assistance to the JRG continued into late October. At that
point, the CIA endorsed Brown’s military suggestions to combat a leftist takeover: “This Agency
welcomes increased DOD participation in operations designed to strengthen the JRG in El
Salvador and to help turn the tide of rising Cuban-supported insurgency in Central America.” 118
Consensus to send more military aid was growing out of fear of leftist guerillas. Plans however
were delayed when President Carter lost the election against President-elect Ronald Reagan. The
election of 1980 reflected the American peoples’ attitude toward Carter. Carter lost the popular
vote by 8.42 million votes and lost the electoral vote by 440 votes.119 Carter’s domestic and
foreign policies had proven unsuccessful, and the fact that Iranian hostage crisis dominated the
news during the last few weeks of the election did not help his campaign.

116

“Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State,” October 19, 1980,
Volume XV, Central America, 1977-1980, Carter Administration, Foreign Relations of the
United States Series (Office of the Historian, Washington D.C.).
117
“Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State,” October 19, 1980,
Volume XV, Central America, 1977-1980, Carter Administration, Foreign Relations of the
United States Series (Office of the Historian, Washington D.C.).
118
“Telegram From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State,” October 19, 1980,
Volume XV, Central America, 1977-1980, Carter Administration, Foreign Relations of the
United States Series (Office of the Historian, Washington D.C.).
119
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Election of 1980,” The American Presidency Project,
accessed May 10, 2018, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1980.
49

In terms of El Salvador, his loss in the election changed the way the Carter
Administration wanted to attend to foreign policy in El Salvador. After the election, Robert
Pastor realized that within the next few months, it was very likely that the U.S. would lose their
ability to influence the JRG. He believed that the right would eventually kick the moderates out
of the JRG if the Reagan Administration did not clearly denounce the right’s violence. Yet,
Pastor was apprehensive of implementing lethal military assistance because Carter lost the
election. He acknowledged that the JRG’s human rights progress still needed to be reviewed and
logistically, the JRG would not be able to absorb all the material promised to them by the end of
Carter’s term. In addition, he understood that giving additional assistance might give the JRG the
wrong idea about their use of repressive tactics. Furthermore, he returned back to the
administration’s original use for military assistance in El Salvador : “Our feelings has long been
that if the Salvadoran military pursues the correct political strategy, then U.S. military assistance
would not be that important or necessary. Conversely, if they did not pursue the correct political
strategy, no amount of U.S. military assistance will help. ” He concluded by stating, “I don’t
think the issue of lethal military assistance need to be addressed in the last three months of the
Carter Administration.” 120 Pastor’s letter not only signifies a drawback in military assistance due
to time constraints but also highlighted that providing military assistance was not as important as
human rights for the Carter Administration.
U.S.-El Salvador relations in November of 1980 seemed to be improving when Duarte
and Fidel Chavez Mena, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador, met President Carter to discuss
providing economic aid and military assistance. Carter did not agree to any of these but rather
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stated that he would expedite the process of reviewing their improvement on human rights in
order for the JRG to receive the helicopters they were promised. The fact that they were on
speaking terms and friendly with one another suggested that El Salvador could be heading in the
direction of securing a pro-democratic regime. 121 Yet, on the last day of November, the
improvements the U.S. government thought the JRG had made were diminished when Duarte
admitted that security forces within the JRG participated in murdering FDR leaders. While
Duarte had agreed to expel members who were involved, Robert White indicated in a letter to the
Department of State that Duarte may have had a plan to continue covering up these murders in
order to gain more authority within the JRG because none of these members would be tried or
punished.
Due to this incident, White urged the Department of State to suspend any ongoing or
future military assistance. Military training teams would also need to depart. In addition, White
strongly urged Washington to write a joint statement declaring that foreign policy in the United
States, regardless of who is president, prioritizes democracy and human rights.122 As for specific
actions in El Salvador, White advocated for the U.S. to “use all of [their] to influence the choices
that will be made within the next few days. At a minimum [the U.S.] must achieve the expulsion
from the armed forces of the middle-level officers who are responsible for the killings and a
rededication of the officer corps to professionalism and a code of conduct.”123 While White had a
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strategy to push the JRG back to a path of democracy, time was running out in his eyes. Two
days later, four American churchwomen were raped and brutally murdered by military forces.

The Four American Churchwomen (December 1980)
On December 2, 1980, four American Churchwomen, nuns from the Maryknoll Order,
flew to El Salvador to do charity work. The Maryknoll Order’s mission was to fight for social
justice on the behalf of the poor. However, many right-wing officials labeled members of
organizations like these either “subversives” or “communists.” Dorothy Kazel an Ursuline sister,
and American lay missionary Jean Donovan were in charge of picking up four of the Maryknoll
sisters from the international airport on this day. First, they picked up Madeline Dorsey and
Teresa Alexander in a white van, and came later that day to pick up two more sisters, Ita Ford
and Maura Clarke. National Guardsmen found the white van suspicious, since they had already
seen it earlier that day and informed their supervisor, Sub-sergeant Luis Antonio Colindres
Alemán. Alemán ordered them to change into civilian clothes and station a squad down the road
from the airport’s traffic checkpoint. After their white van passed the checkpoint and headed to
the end of the road, the squad stopped them, searched their car, and made the women follow
them. After 15 miles the guardsmen stopped. They forced the nuns out of the car, raped them,
and shot them, leaving them on the side of the road to rot. 124 The brutal violence these women
endured was unfortunately quite common in El Salvador. However, because they were
foreigners, Salvadoran civilians reported these dead bodies to a local parish priest. The priest
later contacted Father Paul Schindler, an American pastor relocated to El Salvador from 19721982, and Ambassador Robert White. The bodies were found in a community grave that the
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National Guardsmen hastily created a day later because they realized they were foreigners, not
just Salvadoran civilians. The bodies laid on top of one another: bullet wounds from the
guardsmen made their faces unrecognizable. Other nuns who came to the scene silently prayed.
Local reporters surrounded the bodies taking photos. Eventually this tragic event gained global
attention. 125 Chaos ensued within the Carter Administration. They not only needed to figure out
a way to approach the JRG on the recent FDR murders, but also had to immediately respond to
the murder of four American nuns.
The Carter Administration understood that Salvadoran government officials were most
likely responsible for the December 2nd murders. Robert Pastor’s main concern in a December
4th memorandum was to respond to the FDR murders. He agreed with White’s existing plan of
suspending all military aid, however he also believed that providing incentives would give the
U.S. what they wanted. He suggested that the U.S. should assure “an immediate delivery of
helicopters, a start-up of economic and military aid, and the signing of FY 81 Foreign Military
Sales agreement”, if the JRG: arrested and punished all officers involved in the FDR killings,
including D'Aubuisson, 126sent a High Command official who used repressive tactics abroad as
an ambassador, and enforced agrarian reform by “giving title to the farmers.” 127 In addition,
Robert Pastor felt it was necessary for Ronald Reagan to publicly oppose right-wing and leftwing terrorism and speak in favor of long-overdue reforms in El Salvador. 128 Pastor understood
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the fragility of the situation. Any public statement needed to be carefully composed to provide
stability within the JRG’s government, which had been consistently crumbling.
As for the murders of the Churchwomen, instead of speaking to the JRG privately about
this matter, President Carter decided to launch a public investigation in El Salvador immediately.
This marked “the first time since the Carter administration began backing the government junta
that it [has addressed] publicly the charges of government forces involvement in terrorism here.”
129

In addition to a public investigation, Carter also suspended $25 million in both military and

economic aid. 130 The investigation was launched, dubbed the Bowdler/Rogers mission, and was
led by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs William Bowdler and William D. Rogers.
Its purpose was to conduct a genuine and thorough investigation on the four murders as well as
clearly display the Carter Administration’s full support to the Christian Democrats and military
who condemned and attempted to reduce right-winged violence that had consistently occurred
over the past year. As for military and economic aid, it was clear within the administration that in
order for the JRG to even last a week, economic aid had to be restored. If the JRG’s economy
crumbled, the U.S.’s ability to control that government would completely collapse and an ultraright takeover would likely occur, diminishing the U.S. goal of spreading democracy within El
Salvador. Nonetheless military aid would be suspended until political negotiations between the
Christian Democrats and the military were resolved.131
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In a memorandum written by Robert Pastor to Brzezinski and the President’s Deputy
Assistant for National Security Affairs David Aaron, Pastor addressed the four conditions that
needed to be met before restoring aid. They included:
(1) To reduce the right-wing violence; to gain greater control of the
security forces; and to avoid the perception that the JRG has
shifted sharply to the right.
(2) To assist the JRG in its struggle against the leftist guerrillas.
(3) To assist the JRG to implement the reforms (in particular, to
give Titles to the peasants) and to restore the economy.
(4) To reiterate the JRG’s willingness to dialogue with the
moderate political left.132
In addition, Pastor clearly name dropped several leaders in High Command who need to be
dismissed from office due to their association with the right.133 Pastor’s clear intentions of
publicly holding specific members of the JRG accountable scared the regime.
While this was a successful threat to create fear within the JRG, it only lasted for a short
period of time. Due to the JRG’s economic instability, Carter decided to restore economic aid on
December 17th, only two weeks after suspending it. 134 In a memorandum from Brzezinski
addressed to Carter, Brzezinski reiterated Secretary of State Edmund Muskie’s proposal to
inform the JRG to restore economic aid. In addition, Brzezinski spoke of the Special Committee
Council’s recommendation of also restoring military aid, if the military fulfilled the promises
they made with the Christian Democratic Party to decrease the violence they perpetuated onto
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civilians and other political leaders. Brzezinski agreed with these recommendations and further
listed other necessary steps he thought was needed:
—we are prepared to proceed with military assistance;
—non-lethal materiel in the pipeline would continue to be delivered;
—the helicopter program, with attendant in-country training by MTT’s, will go
forward promptly as soon as the military has made significant progress in
implementing the agreement with the Christian Democrats;
—with further implementation, we would go forward with the $5
million FY 81 FMS Credit Agreement and purchase of $2.3 million in non-lethal
equipment; and
—this could be followed by further MTT training of El Salvadorian armed forces.
(I would rank the MTT’s for the El Salvador army last because they are the most
visible and will require significant political justification both in Salvador and
elsewhere.) 135
Brzezinski ended the letter by stating his recommendations for Carter:
1. That [Carter] authorize informing the El Salvador Government of our
economic assistance plans along the lines of Secretary Muskie’s
memorandum.
2. That [Carter] authorize the Department to instruct Ambassador White to
inform the El Salvador Government of our willingness to resume military
assistance contingent upon their meeting their own commitments along the
above lines. 136
While Carter was able to take on an activist role after the December murders, the restraints and
limitations of being a Commander and Chief restricted his capacity of being an activist. He
unfortunately resorted back to the original plan of continuing to funnel in economic aid and
consider resuming military aid to the JRG in order to avoid further economic instability within El
Salvador that may have resulted into a successful right-wing coup. 137
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The immediate suspension in aid as well as the public launch of an investigation by
Carter and his administration did not come out of nowhere. It was the outcome of built-up
tension, a fractured administration, Carter’s loss in the 1980 presidential election, and his
genuine care for human rights. President Carter began his presidency attempting to bring human
rights into foreign policy. However, implementing human rights policies and shifting old policies
was not simple. He understood that within his own policies, there would be complexities and
contradictions because he could not solely fight for human rights. He also had to do what was
best for U.S. national interest during the Cold War, which meant containing communism where
the U.S. had relations including Latin America. 138 Re-structuring the way presidents have
implemented foreign policy was going to be an uphill battle. In addition, it did not help that the
new government in place in El Salvador, the JRG, did not have the same desires to bring
democracy to the country. Leftist insurgents were an obvious threat to American power due to
their communist and socialist views, yet the JRG’s repressive tactics did not scream democracy
either. At the beginning of 1980, the Carter administration believed that with more time and
acclimation, the JRG would soon practice democracy and soon become a stable pro-democratic
regime; yet, the administration failed to recognize that centuries of repression and oppression
from governing bodies, whether it be colonizers or military dictators, were going to affect the
way new governing bodies were going to treat their citizens, especially since the military of the
old regime was well in tact when the Christian Democrats came into power. For the Salvadoran
people, the JRG would be just the same regime with some progressive members in the mix.
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Carter not only had to shift the way the U.S. treated policy in El Salvador, but also had to find
ways to transform or extract the repressors in the government for his mission to be successful.
On top of this issue, the tensions within the Carter administration added pressure to
Carter’s push for human rights and the JRG’s contradictory position. While everyone within the
administration was on board with the concept of addressing human rights in El Salvador,
different sectors of the administration had contradicting tactics on how to tackle human rights
violations. Going in either direction was a double edged sword for Carter. Robert White’s
attempt to address the human rights violations specifically held the right-wing members of the
JRG accountable. He did not see the left as threat. He saw their actions as a violent response to
the ongoing brutality perpetrated by military officials. White believed that taking away what the
JRG expected from the United States and holding officials accountable for their actions would
help shift the regime toward respecting Salvadoran’s human rights. Yet, many Carter
administration officials did not agree with White’s “dismissal” of leftist violence. If Carter
agreed with White, he would look like a communist sympathizer.
As for the administration officials who disagreed with White and thought it was best to
propose military assistance to the JRG, they felt that they could use military aid to bribe the JRG
to halt human rights violations and at the same time, counteract leftist violence. The problem
with this idea is that it could look like Carter was throwing money at a problem without holding
guilty parties responsible. Either way, Carter’s attempt to bribe the JRG with military funding
while creating protocols and agendas to ensure the JRG would make tangible improvement
proved unsuccessful. With disagreements between the JRG and the administration, the strategies
implemented showed little to no progress; the climate in El Salvador stagnated. His defeat in the
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1980 elections against a staunch anti-Communist ruined his reputation even more. The U.S.
public had no faith in his leadership.
The December 2nd murders of the four churchwomen served as an event for Carter to
throw his previous bureaucratic strategies out the window and revert back to his emphasis on
human rights. His immediate actions after the December 2nd event symbolize the built up
frustration Carter had to deal with from multiple parties as well as his attempt to fulfill the
rhetoric he put forth during his first presidential campaign. While this action taken by Carter is
seen as rash and reckless, considering that economic aid and military aid were in the process of
being resumed almost immediately, it was a form of activism.139 Carter used his resources to
condemn the injustices of those responsible for the death of the four American churchwomen as
well as pushed to investigate how to extract and hold accountable those who were either
partaking or ordering these brutalities to be completed.
Conclusion
The terms activist and activism stems from the actions of a person, group, or an
organization whose purpose is to fight for social, political, and/or economic change to improve
the conditions that society has created to suppress someone’s basic human rights; President
Jimmy Carter is an example of someone who did this in El Salvador during the year 1980.
Examples of activism and activists who have participated in pushing for change in policies and
dismantling structures to promote justice and true democracy within the United States can be
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traced back a mere 50 years ago during the Civil Rights Era. Activists such as Martin Luther
King and Dolores Huerta, or organizations such as the Black Panther Party and anti-war
protestors fought for numerous campaigns to ensure there was justice and equity within the U.S.
for various marginalized communities. In addition, activist groups wanted to hold certain
individuals and organizations accountable for their wrongful actions. Their tactics included
peaceful or silent protests, violent protests, lobbying Congress, boycotts, banner drops, sit-ins,
etc. While strategic actions and measures may have differed across their organizations, all of
them had one attribute in common: they all were on the margins of society. Their goal was to
push for change from the outside and persuade bureaucratic officials to take them seriously.
While activists have traditionally been seen as pushing for change from the outside, activists can
also be a part of the bureaucratic system where they can implement change from the inside.
Jimmy Carter is an example of this kind of activist.
Carter’s actions in December of 1980 to cut economic and military aid as well as launch
an investigation to find and hold those accountable of murdering the four American
churchwomen as well as those responsible for the torture and murders of Salvadoran citizens and
officials since the JRG came into power, all reflected his commitment to activism. While his
activism seemed unexpected and irrational, Carter’s actions were caused by built up frustration
stemming from the continuous push and pull of taking on the presidential duty of looking out for
U.S. interest during the Cold War while simultaneously being an activist and pushing the
envelope to bring social justice to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.
The beginning of his human rights journey in El Salvador began when most of the JRG
was on the same page of his human rights agenda (emphasis on most). While the FDR’s values
aligned with bringing a US. approved, pro-democratic regime into power, the military in place
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could not leave their lust for oligarchical power behind, including their repressive tactics of
beating, torturing, and killing officials, civilians, and leftist insurgents who wanted reform and
change that went against previous policies and regulation. The U.S. was backing a government
who did not fully commit to the democracy and values the United States under Carter’s
leadership preached. Unlike previous presidents who would not consider nor care for human
rights violations in these developing countries as long as the U.S. retained authoritative power,
Carter did care about human rights, not only for the benefit of the United States during the Cold
War, but also for the benefit of the citizens in countries who were involved.
Within the first two months of 1980, human rights violations occurred left and right and
Carter and his administration had to do something about it. This was the start of Carter’s plan of
figuring out how to stop these human rights violations while also making sure he and his
administration kept good relations with the JRG. This was needed to secure a pro-democratic
regime in Latin America to further American superiority in the Cold War. (The United States had
already lost Cuba, and Nicaragua to a certain extent, as regional allies.) This is why Carter had to
still support the JRG publicly. Yet, privately his administration was trying to find alternative
ways to decrease the torture and assassinations happening daily on Salvadoran grounds.
However, when it came to finding a plan that his cabinet approved of, government officials had
different approaches in the handling of human rights violations.
The Carter administration put human rights at the forefront because that was Carter’s
official foreign policy. The administration created the plan of incentivizing the JRG to embrace
better human rights policies, by making helicopters and military training available if the JRG
decreased human rights violations. Yet, the follow through on continuing human rights violations
as well as the threat level of the leftist insurgents greatly differed between cabinet members.
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Brzezinski, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the National Security
Council Staff all agreed that while the JRG’s fulfillment of the this plan was a necessity, they felt
that it was unrealistic. Ambassador Robert White’s specific human rights requests, which Carter
personally asked for to ensure structural change within the regime’s policies, could not be
successfully completed according to the rest of the cabinet members. They felt that there was not
enough tangible evidence for the JRG to prove they were fulfilling the human rights goals. As
long as the JRG tried to halt the injustice, that would be enough for the more skeptical voices in
Carter’s administration. This idea of White’s requests as being too “unrealistic” was an echo of
previous U.S. foreign policy thinking as well as the Cold War mentality. Foreign policy advisors
rarely had to conquer issues such as this because previous presidents never looked at human
rights the way Carter did. Due to this, sacrificing more instability of securing a pro-democratic
El Salvador for the sake of human rights seemed to be too great of a risk for U.S. interest.
As for comparing leftist violence to JRG violence, most of the cabinet felt that leftist
violence was the bigger threat, and this largely contributed to the preeminence of the Cold War
mentality and maintaining an emphasis on containment and national security above other
concerns. Radical, structural change screamed communism and undemocratic behavior, resulting
in the U.S.’s opposition against them. This left White alone in his agenda of bringing justice to
Salvadoran citizens even if it was a huge risk for the United States because in his mind, human
rights trumped U.S. interest. With the majority of the administration agreeing to put U.S. interest
first, Carter went with that plan. It is evident that Carter was in agreement with White in that he
wanted to hold the JRG accountable, yet he relied on advisors, who were knowledgeable on how
to operate within a Cold War world, to make his ultimate decision of agreeing to helicopters and
military training with whatever the JRG would do to decrease human right violations, even if it
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was solely lip service. For the first eleven months of 1980, President Carter compromised the
depth of his human rights agenda for his presidential duty of putting U.S. needs first, which was
to win or at least keep Soviet influence out of Latin America, the United States’ backyard.
Unfortunately, human rights violations increased.
The continuous meetings and small gains the U.S. made with the JRG only lasted for a
short time. Civilian death was normalized and did not decrease. While some leaders of the JRG
did want to change their way of leading, due to their fear of losing military training and
helicopters, the fear was not enough to truly hold those who were guilty accountable for their
actions. The JRG understood the importance their country had in this Cold War, and believed the
United States would give in eventually. Plus, the administration was aware of this but did not
understand to what degree their power was dwindling. To Carter, it seemed that it was getting
better, which can be expressed in his meeting with Duarte and Mena in November 1980 when
they discussed economic and military aid. While the leaders were friendly, Carter was adamant
on making sure the JRG followed through with their end of the deal. When meeting with one
another, they both spoke highly of each other:
President Carter welcomed Duarte and Chavez Mena to the White House and said
that he admired Duarte’s courage and his leadership and that we supported the
Government of El Salvador in its struggle to promote important changes in that
country, and to resist terrorism from both right and left […] [Duarte said] he
strongly supported and admired the President’s human rights policy, and felt that
the President had done important things with his policy, not only in El Salvador,
but throughout Latin America.140
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Yet, Carter adamantly argued for decreased human rights violations when Duarte asked for the
U.S. to provide helicopters, which the U.S. agreed to in their FY 81 Foreign Military Sales
Agreement:
In speaking to Duarte, President Carter said that he is not promising that he would
go ahead with the helicopters, since he would want to review the conditions and
make an assessment first. But he would expedite the process.141
Even though Carter had compromised his human rights policies in El Salvador for the Cold
War, he did not drop the importance of human rights. During this meeting, he saw promise in
eventual securement of a democratic regime in El Salvador.
Yet, the truth of the violence reached White House ears when FDR officials were
assassinated by right-wing security forces. The human rights agenda was not working. Rather
than improvement, high ranking leaders were killed and no one was going to be held
accountable, even though the culprits were known. Back in the United States, Carter had already
lost the election to president-elect Ronald Reagan. Carter’s reputation as President was awful. To
the United States and abroad, his domestic and foreign policies were unsuccessful and in their
eyes, he was not fit to be president of the United States. While this could be seen as an
unfortunate event, it also could have conceivably been a stress reliever for Carter. He did not
have to appease the U.S. population or other government officials because he had already hit
rock bottom and only had a few weeks until he left office. There was not much time for him to
fix complex situations and prove that he could still be a “fit” president. He had hit rock bottom.
However, the rape and murder of the four American churchwomen lowered the bar.
This event pushed him to the edge. In El Salvador, his administration was not able to put
forth the human rights policy Carter wanted nor could his administration stop the leftist
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insurgency. People had no faith in him to combat communist influence nor halt social injustice.
The rape and death of the American churchwomen gave him the chance to be the activist he was
trying to be the entire time he was president. With his term almost over, and no real solution to
this issue, he was finally able to push for the human rights policy he wanted to have in the first
place by holding the JRG accountable for their lack of transparency and dismissal of guilty
parties without the constraints of worrying about the Cold War and what the rest of the world
would think about him as the President of the United States. In addition, these were American
citizens who were killed. This gave him more of an opportunity to dive in and create economic
and political instability within El Salvador because American lives were involved. He
understood that this action was not the solution to fixing the corruption in El Salvador, but
served to question not only the JRG’s practices, but also traditional U.S. foreign policy practices.
The humiliation and vulnerability both he and his administration endured to hold the regime
accountable for these murders as well as past murders was powerful, and should not be
overlooked. As President of the United States, he was confined to a box where he had to
compromise on human rights and morality for Cold War national security and did not have room
to be an unfettered activist. Yet, due to the timing of this event, he was able to strategically be an
activist within his bureaucratic role.
Jimmy Carter’s limited success with his human rights policy was not because his agenda
was naive or simple, it was because he was trying to change the traditional structure and reform
the way U.S. foreign policy was created and executed. Latin American governments in power
and U.S. government officials were only knowledgeable of the traditional way foreign policy
worked; and did not plan on such a radical change, especially during the Cold War, where U.S.
authority was at stake. Political scientists and historians neglect to see the resilience Carter had
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when he consistently pushed for human rights not only in El Salvador, but also during his four
years as president, due to his job description as Commander in Chief, putting U.S. national
interest at the top of the list. Being a leader within a bureaucracy hindered his ability to be an
activist because a bureaucracy hinders one’s ability to successfully create political and social
change. He struggled with the confinements of leading a bureaucracy and his resilience, strength,
and passion for human rights. Rather than seeing Carter solely as an ineffective president; Carter
should be seen as a struggling activist within the restrictive role as president. By looking at
Carter in this light, scholars can look at Carter’s actions during his presidency with a new
understanding and lens.
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